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A Forgotten Revolution?
Army Co-operation Command and
Artillery Co-operation, 1940-1942

MATTHEW

POWELL

Abstract: This article looks at the development of the A ir Observation Post
during the inter-war period and the Second World War. It places these
developments within the context of the procedures that had emerged from
the First World War. Further to this it analyses the role played in this
process by Army Co-operation Command and its commander, A ir Marshal
Sir Arthur Barratt, who it has been claimed previously did all he could to
prevent the development of the A ir Observation Post concept. Evidence will
show Barratt’s actions in a new light especially against his experiences in
the Battle of France.

the role of the Royal Air Force’s (r a f )
Army Co-operation Command in the development of artillery
observation in Britain between 1940 and 1942. It provides the
historical context by exploring the artillery procedures in use during
the First World War. These methods changed little by the outbreak
of the Second World War in 1939,1 and failed in the fluid, mobile
warfare the British Expeditionary Force (b e f ) faced during the
German offensive in France in 1940.2 The article then analyzes the
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1 Hilary Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939 (New York
and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944), 256-7; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick
Graham, Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military Classics 2004 [George Allen and Unwin, 1982]), 150.
2 H.J. Parham and E.M.G.Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle: The Story of the Air
Observation Post, 2nd ed. (Chippenham: Picton Publishing, 1986), 5-6. John Buckley,
© Canadian Military History 23, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 71- 88.
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work undertaken by the newly created Army Co-operation Command
in response to that failure, and particularly examines the part played
by its commander, Air Marshal Sir Arthur “Ugly” Barratt. Historians
have misinterpreted his role as deliberately obstructionist. This is
too simplistic an explanation of his actions and motives. It fails to
take into account his experience as an artillery officer in the First
World War, and as the Royal Air Force commander in France in
1940, which made him at once an advocate of closer inter-service
cooperation and a sceptic about hasty solutions.3

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War considerably changed artillery ranging and
spotting procedures. Both sound ranging and flash spotting involved
locating enemy artillery batteries when the guns were fired.4 Sound
ranging used microphones to detect the sound, while flash spotting
identified the location of the batteries through the flash emitted
through firing. These changes were brought about by the advent of
mass armies, the industrial scale high explosive munitions combined
with the use of aircraft creating a revolution in military affairs.5 The
ingenuity required to combine air and land forces was great, but
the outcome, if successful, would make the whole greater than the
sum of its parts. W ith the distances between the guns increasing,
judging the fall of shot became more difficult. These distances also
required the artillery to develop techniques for “indirect fire,” that
is to engage targets unseen by the battery commander.6 The Royal
Artillery had no experience using this weapon at the operational

“The Air War in France,” in Brian Bond and Michael D. Taylor, eds., The Battle
of France and Flanders, 1940: Sixty Years On (Barnsley : Leo Cooper, 2001), 122.
3 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 21. Peter Mead, The Eye in the Air:
A History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army 1785-1945 (London:
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1983), 163.
4 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 109.
5 Jonathan Bailey has described this combination as the first and only true revolution
in military affairs. See Jonathan B.A. Bailey, “Deep Battle 1914-1941: The Birth of
the Modern Style of War,” Field Artillery Journal (July-August 1998): 21-7. There
is still a fierce debate between historians as to whether the developments in artillery,
aircraft and the scale on which it was used constitutes a revolution in military affairs.
One of the best counter-arguments to Bailey’s claims is made by Bidwell and Graham.
6 The Royal Artillery “paid lip service to concealment” and the idea of indirect fire.
Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 21.
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level as such a use was never contemplated.7 Several methods were
developed in order to assist artillery batteries correct their fall of
shot as quickly as possible and increase the efficiency of the guns.8
Artillery co-operation with aircraft developed quickly as the
conditions of static trench warfare allowed artillery-spotting techniques
to advance at a more rapid pace than if the conflict had been a
mobile war.9 One of the first major developments that took place
was the creation and refinement of the “clock code” system.10 Using
this system, a pilot of the Royal Flying Corps (r f c ), the forerunner
to the r a f , was able to correct the guns’ fall of shot by passing to
the artillery battery commander by wireless the details of how far
the shell impacts were from the target. The pilot would correct the
shooting by pointing out how far away and in what direction the
artillery shells had landed. The distance would be communicated
using numbers and the direction using the picture of a clock face.
The target was placed in the middle of the clock face and shells that
fell beyond the target and on a straight line to the target would be
corrected with a call of 12, if it fell short on the same line the call
would be six, at 90 degrees left of the target nine and 90 degrees right
three. Any other direction would be corrected by using the hour on
the clock with which it corresponded.
This system functioned perfectly well throughout the First World
War and was the basic system that the r a f went to war with in 1939
during shoots against impromptu targets. During the First World
War, aircraft conducted artillery reconnaissance in relative safety
behind their own lines. They were able to align themselves with the
battery and target in a timely fashion and allowed this type of co
operation to flourish. Due to the r f c being under army command,
aircrew were able to mix and socialize with the gunners they were
supporting, increasing mutual understanding and efficiency. When

7 Jonathan B.A. Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of
Warfare (London: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 7-9. Bidwell and
Graham, Fire-Power, 19-21.
8 Jonathan B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford : Military Press,
5.
9 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical
Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security
International, 2009), 4. Peter Simkins, Air Fighting 1914-1918: The Struggle for
Air Superiority over the Western Front (London: Imperial War Museum, 1978), 11.
10 Ralph Barker, A Brief History of the Royal Flying Corps in World War I (London:
Constable & Co., 2002), 63.
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unfamiliar formations were working together, however, that efficiency
fell away.11
In 1915, a new technique was tried using the kite balloon.
Hydrogen-filled balloons allowed spotters to remain in the air for
extended periods as compared to aircraft of the day. Enemy artillery
batteries were able to remain silent whilst enemy aircraft were in
the vicinity overhead, but they did not have that advantage when
balloons were stationed around that section of the line. The balloons
were, however, vulnerable to long-range shelling and had to be taken
down in the event of an attack. Vulnerability to both ground and
air fire meant that observers carried parachutes, a luxury that had
not been afforded to pilots. The r f c troops in the balloon could
communicate with the battery via a telephone link, unavailable to
aircraft, and corrections were made using the “clock code” system. By
1916, this co-operation improved with the introduction of a relatively
lightweight wireless telegraphy (w / t ) transmitter, which facilitated
communications between air and ground. Another improvement
in ground-air communication was the Central Wireless Station
“established in late 1916 ... These provided a logical solution to the
problem of directing attack aircraft against targets encountered by
corps [that is, artillery spotting] machines.” 12 Because of developments
in wireless technology, a number of aircraft could be controlled on any
given length of front. This enabled “any observer ... to communicate
with any battery via a telephone exchange and rapidly engage any
target that he could identify in pre-arranged zones of the front.”13
The return to fluid battles in late 1918 had very little effect upon
the methods used by the r a f for conducting artillery observation
because the techniques had been so thoroughly developed and
practised during the period of static trench warfare. David Jordan
has highlighted that at the Third Battle of the Aisne in M ayJune 1918, “the very fact that artillery work was nothing more
than routine by this point implies that the r a f had mastered this
duty.” 14 They were assisted by the flash spotting and sound ranging
techniques developed by the Royal Artillery. These techniques

11 Barker, A Brief History of the Royal Flying Corps, 85.
12 Barker, A Brief History of the Royal Flying Corps, 85, 89, 91, 142; David Jordan,
“The Army Co-operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force 1914
1918,” PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1997, 315.
13 Mead, The Eye in the Air, 100. Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 102.
14 Jordan, “Army Co-operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air
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allowed counter-battery work to continue even when German artillery
batteries were camouflaged or the weather prevented flying. The
major problem that the r a f encountered during the Allied advance
in 1918 was that, due to the relative speed of the advance, the
German guns could simply not be located.15 This meant that while
the techniques themselves were sound, they could not be as widely
applied as before.

THE AIR OBSERVATION POST

For the most part, interwar training for artillery observation
continued to use procedures similar to those of 1917.16 Peacetime
conditions imposed constraints, notably as a result of the lack of
sufficient artillery ammunition : “miniature ranges ... were used in
squadrons to introduce pilots to artillery procedure but could not
teach artillery observation.” 17
The system of correcting artillery fire for an impromptu shoot
remained unchanged until 1938. One difficulty, according to Shelford
Bidwell and Dominick Graham, was that this system “still required
specially trained Royal Air Force Officers using a special procedure
flying in slow aircraft in enemy air space and vertically, or thereabouts,
over the target.”18 A less perilous approach, the Air Observation Post
(a i r o p ) concept, was developed in 1935 by Captain H.C. Bazely,
Royal Artillery, who was secretary of the Royal Artillery Flying
Club. In the words of Bidwell and Graham:
Bazely’s idea was to provide batteries or brigades of the Royal Artillery
with the same sort of small, low-powered aircraft that the officers of
the flying club flew for pleasure, able to take off from a meadow or a
dirt strip close to the gun positions. The aircraft was to be merely a
mount or a flying platform for artillery officers, who would use ordinary
artillery procedures for ranging a battery. They would not fly over

Force,” 279.
15 Jordan, “Army Co-operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air
Force,” 198-199, 310.
16 Mead, The Eye in the Air, 149.
17 Mead, The Eye in the Air, 149.
18 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 262.
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enemy territory, but over their own guns or near them, gaining enough
height to targets on ground dead to ground OPs.19

The Air Ministry opposed modifying the clock code system as they
believed it was adequate to meet the future needs of the army. They
felt that light aircraft could no longer remain in action close to
artillery units, as had been the case in the First World War and that
artillery officers could not be trained to the necessary standard of
airmanship. The Air Council feared introducing a new and untried
procedure with the growing tensions in Europe at this time. The War
Office was unimpressed with the Air Council’s attitude and pushed
for more to be done. The Air Ministry agreed to trials by 22 [Army
Co-operation] Group and the School of Artillery in December 1938.
These and further trials, showed that light aircraft could observe fire
with the “clock code” system. Supermarine Spitfires conducted mock
attacks and the Taylorcraft light aircraft observing the artillery fire
demonstrated the agility to evade these modern fighters.20 There was,
however, no training for pilots in registering targets for the artillery.
If an artillery officer required an appraisal of a prospective target
the request had to be sent up the command chain via an air liaison
officer. When the information on the target finally came back to the
artillery battery, it was usually out of date.21 There was pressure
from within the War Office to establish a Flying Observation Post
( f l y i n g o p ) and to begin flying training for gunner officers, and
thus overcome r a f aircrews’ lack of knowledge of suitable targets.
A f l y i n g o p , operating behind the Allied front for protection by
friendly anti-aircraft guns, was to work in conjunction with the
Ground Observation Post ( g r o u n d o p ) in establishing targets to be
engaged.
The first of these f l y i n g o p s was established in February 1940
“to determine in the light of practical experience obtained under war
conditions the possibilities and limitations ... the most suitable type
of aircraft and the most suitable organization.” The tests were to be
conducted in three parts, an initial training period, then a training

19 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 262.
20 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 14. Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power,
262-263.
21 Darrell Knight, Artillery Flyers at War: A History of the 664, 665, and 666
‘Air Observation Post’ Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Bennington:
Vermont: Merriam Press, 2010), 27.
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period with the French, and finally a test in the French Army area
including shoots against German targets. At this time, the term Air
Observation Post was adopted. The observer aircraft, “Air OP Flight
(D Flight),” went to France on 19 April 1940 and then began the
test programme. Arrangements for the final - combat - phase were
completed on 9 May 1940,22 but the following day the Germans invaded
France and the Low Countries.23 The French artillery designated for
the trials was forced to return to their formations leaving the a i r o p
Flight waiting for the campaign to stabilize. When it was clear that
this would not happen, the observer aircraft returned to England.24
The development of the a i r o p had been started too late to have any
effect on the Battle of France or to gain any operational experience
with which to develop the concept. The fault for the delay can to a
certain degree be attributed to the Air Council, which was reluctant
to alter existing doctrine and slow to set up the a i r o p .

ARMY CO-OPERATION COMMAND

The r a f ’ s new Army Co-operation Command, created on 1 December
1940, became responsible for D Flight. It had up to six aircraft
on strength, which, aside from a single Stinson Voyager, included
Taylorcraft Plus machines.25 One of the first and most pressing
problems the new command had to address was the development
of artillery cooperation policy in concert with the army. David Hall
broached the major issue for both services after the defeat in France:
“Who should control aircraft on the battlefield?” - and what those
aircraft should do.26 “Advocates of the Air Observation Post were
faced with the greatest challenges,” in the words of Darrell Knight:
“The most pressing question being asked was, ‘how much risk was

22 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 15-6.
23 Karl-Heinz Freiser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West
(Annapolis: Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 79.
24 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 16.
25 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 15. Army Co-operation Command at
this time consisted of several squadrons of Lysander aircraft.
26 David Hall, “Lessons Not Learned: The Struggle between the Royal Air Force and
Army for the Tactical Control of Aircraft, and the Post-mortem on the defeat of the
British Expeditionary Force in France in 1940,” in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till,
eds., The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience (Basingstoke and
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 113.
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too much for an airborne O P pilot to survive while flying at low level
in the face of enemy ground formation, or in a sky filled with enemy
fighters?’ ”27
There had been serious problems with the use of slow and
obsolescent Westland Lysander aircraft to fulfil that role during the
fighting in France. The few attempts that had been made to conduct
air shoots resulted in the destruction of the aircraft or it being driven
off by enemy fighters.28 As a result, most artillery observation during
the Battle of France was done by g r o u n d o p units.29 Between the
defeat in France and the creation of Army Co-operation Command, the
army, while preparing anti-invasion measures, attempted to develop
an air observation policy. That there was very little enthusiasm in the
r a f is hardly surprising as the service was preoccupied with fighting
the Battle of Britain. Still, the air force clearly understood that air
observation for artillery fire was a vital necessity for land warfare.30
One of the first steps to changing artillery co-operation policy was
a letter from the director of military co-operation, Air Commodore
Victor Goddard, to Barratt at Army Co-operation Command. Not
only was Barratt one of the senior officers most experienced in
army co-operation, he had begun his military career in the artillery.
He was therefore exceptionally well qualified to develop artillery
procedure as well as larger army co-operation issues.31 In this letter,
Goddard stated that the Air Staff were against the formation of
“special air units for artillery observation or reconnaissance, unless
it can be clearly shown that there is an urgent requirement for such
units which cannot be met by Army Co-operations squadrons.”32 To
allow Army Co-operation squadrons an opportunity to fulfil this role,
Goddard argued that artillery co-operation policy should be modified
and re-stated, even if this required the development of a new aircraft.
Goddard wanted the aircraft of the a i r o p to “act as an elevated
observation post [that] was to be capable of flying off and landing on

27 Knight, Artillery Flyers at War, 32.
28 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 17.
29 Knight, Artillery Flyers at War, 32.
30 Parham and Belfield, Unarmed Into Battle, 18.
31 < http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/locreg/BARRATT.html>, accessed 25 April 2013.
32 The UK National Archives [TNA] AIR 39/47, Letter from Air Commodore
Goddard, Director of Military Co-operation to Barratt regarding Artillery Co
operation Policy, 8 December 1940.
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a position close to the guns with which it would be co-operating, and
was to be piloted by a gunner officer competent to perform a shoot.”33
Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Woodall, the senior army staff officer
at Arm y Co-operation Command, requested a report on what
organizational form the a i r o p should take if it were developed. He
also wanted the report to address the role of Arm y Co-operation
squadrons in artillery work if the a i r o p was or was not developed.
The report, completed on 18 December 1940, gave the School of
Artillery’s view that the a i r o p had not truly represented “that for
which it was originally intended” because of the different meanings
ascribed to the term “Observation Post” by the gunner and layman.
The school wished to further emphasize that “the Air O P is, and
has always been, intended to carry out a role entirely similar but
supplementary to that of the normal Artillery O P on the ground.”34
The a i r o p should be developed on the basis of one per artillery
regiment and should contain one officer pilot of the Royal Artillery
and three other ranks. The role of Army Co-operation squadrons fell
into four distinct areas, only two of which have relevance to this paper.
These would be reconnaissance to supplement what could be seen
by g r o u n d o p s and constantly observe the areas where the hostile
batteries were located while active operations were in progress.35
The School of Artillery believed that the role of army co
operation squadrons faced very little change regardless of whether
the a i r o p was fully developed. The officers of army co-operation
aircraft, however, required additional training in land operations to
ensure they thoroughly understood army requirements and operating
methods ; in short to make certain that air crew spoke the same
language as the people they were supporting on the ground. A certain
number should specialize in artillery work and attend the School of
Artillery. In this way, the School of Artillery sought to allow aircraft
to have tactical control over the fire of artillery batteries. The school
further advised that a multi-seat aircraft should be employed to
accommodate an artillery officer who would conduct the shoot and
thus obviate the need for artillery officers learning to fly. Artillery

33 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Air Commodore Goddard, 8 December 1940.
34 TNA AIR 39/47, Report on Artillery Co-operation, 18 December 1940.
35 The four areas were the observation of the forward zone, constant observation of
the hostile battery area while operations were in progress, occasional observation
further over enemy lines and to produce photographs on which to base future fire
plans. TNA AIR 39/47, Report on Artillery Co-operation, 18 December 1940.
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officers, the school also recommended, should be seconded to army
co-operation squadrons specifically for artillery work.36
Number 70 Group, a training group, and 71 Group, the operational
formation of Arm y Co-operation Command, agreed that the a i r o p
performed a necessary service and should be allocated on the scale of
one per artillery regiment. The groups also felt that any changes in
the fire procedure that shortened the time aircraft spent performing
that role “is an asset.” One of the ideas put forward to effect this
recommendation was the adoption of artillery methods of fire control.37
The co-operative spirit evident in the report of 18 December 1940 is
surprising in view of the strained relations between the army and r a f
in the wake of the Battle of France.38 The officer appointed by the
army to conduct its investigation of that defeat was General William
Bartholomew, renowned for his anti-R A F feelings and a hatred of
combined service solutions. He approached the investigation with the
conviction that the army’s tactical doctrine during the battle had
been sound. It was the r a f and a lack of the correct type of air
support that had led to the disaster on the continent.39 By contrast,
the agreement on air-land cooperation in artillery work between the
School of Artillery and the officers of 70 and 71 Groups is an example
of the good relations that existed between lower formations.
In January 1941, Barratt wrote to the under-secretary of State for
Air describing the best way to co-operate with the Royal Artillery :
“I consider that in order to get a true and undistorted picture of
this problem, it is first desirable to set out the problem as the Army
sees it, and to show in this picture what they conceive to be their
requirements.”40 Again, the desire to see the problem from a view
that would almost certainly be contradictory to the r a f shows that
Barratt and his command were willing to adopt a different approach
and attitude in co-operating with at least one part of the army.
In an appendix to this letter the School of Artillery’s opinion was

36 TNA AIR 39/47, Report on Artillery Co-operation, 18 December 1940.
37 TNA AIR 39/47, The Future of Artillery Co-operation Replies from Nos. 70 and
17 Groups, 18 December 1940.
38 For more information on the army’s reaction to the Battle of France see TNA
CAB 106/220, Bartholomew Committee Final Report. Hall, pp.55-9.
39 Alistair Byford, “The Battle of France, May 1940: Enduring, Combined and Joint
Lessons,” Air Power Review 11, no.2 (Summer 2006): 68.
40 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Barratt to Under-Secretary of State for Air regarding
co-operation with the Royal Artillery, 29 January 1941.
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again put forward, outlining the role that aircraft should play in
artillery spotting. The school argued that with the change in the
tempo of warfare the old methods would simply not produce the
required results. It is “no longer possible for an aircraft carrying
out artillery reconnaissance to patrol methodically over territory
occupied by the enemy.” The way to adapt to these new conditions
was to have high observation posts from which it would be possible to
see much more of the battlefield and, as a result, be able to direct the
fire of several artillery batteries.41 In the case of operations in Britain
against a German invasion, the vulnerable aircraft conducting the
reconnaissance for the artillery would come under the protection of an
umbrella of aircraft from Fighter Command.42 Nevertheless, Barratt
voiced his concerns about the ability of the a i r o p to operate in the
face of enemy action: “the Air O P must be entirely vulnerable to any
enemy fighters which cares to shoot it down.”43 Barratt’s frequently
expressed concern over the safety of the pilots conducting shoots as
an a i r o p using the gunner system can partly be explained through
his experiences during the Battle of France. He had had to send
aircrews to their deaths by ordering unsuitable Fairey Battle aircraft
to attack temporary German pontoon bridges across the Meuse River
after the Germans had crossed and been able to organize effective
anti-aircraft defences.44
The communications system recommended for use in aircraft
conducting artillery co-operation was also the subject of much
discussion. One of the major issues was whether to use wireless
telegraphy or radio telephony. One of the overriding factors that
influenced this decision was the simplicity of training : “The time
factor and the constant flow of casualties will prevent any possibility
of producing a class of highly skilled specialists.” The main features
of the air observers’ training emphasized artillery gunnery procedures
and the tactical knowledge of flying required to get maximum value
out of his observation. To simplify the training as much as possible

41 TNA AIR 39/47, Appendix A to Letter from Barratt to Under-Secretary of
State for Air regarding co-operation with the Royal Artillery, 29 January 1941,
Report on Artillery Requirements in Air Co-operation as they affect Royal Air Force
Commitments.
42 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Army Co-operation Command to Headquarters No.
71 Group, Artillery Reconnaissance - Policy and Training 20 March 1941.
43 TNA AIR 39/47, Appendix A, 29 January 1941.
44 Hall, Strategy for Victory, 51.
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special communications procedures were to be abolished. The use of
radio, in contrast to wireless telegraphy, did not require “such officers
acquiring a fairly high standard of morse [code], and maintaining
a constant handiness in the manipulation of the Artillery Code.”
The recommendation was for an artillery officer “acting as his own
signaller and transmitting orders by two-way R /T .”45 Later, in
February 1941, Barratt argued that the aircraft currently available
for artillery co-operation (Lysanders) could not perform the role
expected under the new proposals, especially in the face of “even
moderate enemy opposition” and that the squadrons must be re
equipped with a fighter aircraft in order to be able to fully carry out
artillery observation.46

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

In response to a letter from No.71 Group regarding the development
of policy and training for the artillery observation role, Army Co
operation Command stated they felt that “the case against the Air
OP would seem probably conclusive.”47 A further reply in late March
to No.71 Group’s letter argued that working in an anti-invasion role
artillery co-operation aircraft were to use a “flash-spotting” technique,
provided the topography was already known. W ith anti-invasion
measures implemented in the summer of 1940, it must be assumed
that the majority of the topography over which these operations
were conducted would already be known due to familiarity with the
potential landing areas. There was also confirmation that the current
procedure was still to be used in these circumstances.48
Further trials of a new artillery procedure were conducted in
March 1941 when the aircraft observed and corrected the fall of shot
as it flew over the target. A single-seat fighter was best suited to
this role, which required flying over enemy lines, and for this reason

45 TNA AIR 39/47, Memorandum regarding Artillery/Air Co-operation. 6 February
1941.
46 TNA AIR 39/47, Memorandum on Artillery Reconnaissance, February 1941.
47 TNA AIR 39/47, Memorandum in reply to a Letter from No. 71 Group to Army
Co-operation Command. Letter dated 14 February 1941. Memorandum dated 17
March 1941.
48 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter to No. 71 Group from Army Co-operation Command,
Artillery Reconnaissance - Policy and Training, 20 March 1941.
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a Hawker Hurricane carried out the trials. The first test, which used
the old reconnaissance procedure, was designed to “find out if there
was any difficulty in positioning a low wing monoplane while making
the observations.” In the words of the report, “there was none.”49 The
second shoot took into account the tactical situation that might be
faced by aircraft in this role. During this shoot the initial ranging
salvos were timed to arrive at the target at the same time as the
aircraft.50 The procedure was altered slightly : the order to fire was
“answered by two salvos instead of three, since it was considered to
be too difficult to make three observations during one run over the
target.” The final shoot simulated the observation of long-range fire
by a delay of 30 seconds between the order to fire and the firing of
the guns. Thus the pilot had to time his run more accurately to allow
for both the delay in the guns firing and the time required for the
aircraft to reach the target. The major conclusion reached from these
trials was that the Hurricane was not suitable for prolonged artillery
reconnaissance shoots because the pilot, having to keep a lookout for
enemy aircraft while operating his own high performance machine,
was not able to give his attention to the ground for more than a few
seconds.51
During a conference held at the headquarters of Arm y C o 
operation Command it was suggested the “clock code” system be
abolished and replaced by the normal artillery procedure.52 The pilot
would correct shots by ordering the battery to add, drop, or adjust
left or right in divisions of one hundred yards. A trial held in April
1941, on similar lines to the one in March but using Lysander aircraft,
showed that with suitable weather conditions artillery reconnaissance
could be conducted without penetrating enemy territory, and that with
two-way radio communications, the artillery method of correcting fire
was quicker than using the “clock code.” A n impromptu shoot could
also be conducted with an unaassigned battery using the artillery

49 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Reconnaissance in a Single Seater Fighter Type, March
1941.
50 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Reconnaissance in a, Mar 1941; TNA AIR 39/47,
Letter from the Under Secretary of State for Air to Barratt, 5 April 1941.
51 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Reconnaissance in a Single Seater Fighter Type, March
1941.
52 TNA AIR 39/47, Conference at Headquarters Army Co-operation Command on
Artillery Reconnaissance, Procedure, Orthodox Artillery Co-operation, 9 April 1941.
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method.53 The pilots were “unanimous [in their opinion] that this
method of directing fire to fall on the targets, is simpler and quicker
than the clock code method of observing the fall of the rounds.” The
Lysander was also more effective in this role than the Hurricane due
to “its excellent visibility, its small turning circle, and its ability to
operate from improvised advanced landing grounds, and the fact that
it has its own tail protection.”54
Barratt responded sceptically. He considered “that body
of experience gained in the late war and since has all pointed to
the advantages of the ‘Clock Code’ system.”555
6This viewpoint was
reinforced by the senior artillery officer of Eastern Command,
Brigadier Duncan, although he believed that the a i r o p had a useful
function supplementing the information gained through normal
artillery reconnaissance, including the land o p . 56 Barratt noted that
with highly trained pilots it had always been possible to shoot a
battery from the air using the artillery method. Barratt’s belief in the
“clock code” system stemmed not from conservatism, but more from
fear of conclusions drawn from brief experiments being widely applied
among air crew who by the nature of wartime circumstances could
not be highly trained.57 When Barratt had to account to the under
secretary of state for air for the lack of efficiency in air cooperation
with artillery he wrote that it “has been due to the propagation of
rumour as to other and better methods than those shown in AP1176
[The R A F Manual of Army Co-operation].”58
Further trials were conducted using the artillery method during
April 1941 and reached similarly positive conclusions “Artillery
methods of ranging by corrections to line and range are simpler,
quicker, and more efficient than any method based on the ‘clock
code.’ They lend themselves more readily to observation from a low
altitude behind our own lines, and are more in accordance with
the realities of modern air fighting and A A [anti-aircraft] defence.”

53 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Co-operation Trials - Part I, April, 1941.
54 TNA AIR 39/47, Artillery Co-operation Trails - Part II, April 1941.
55 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Headquarters Army Co-operation Command to
Headquarters No. 70 Group, Artillery Reconnaissance Trials, 12 April 1941.
56 TNA AIR 39/47, Note for Commander-in-Chief on Brigadier Duncan’s visit, 14
April 1941.
57 TNA AIR 39/47, Army Co-operation Command to No. 70 Group.
58 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Barratt to Under Secretary of State for Air, 14
April 1941.
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Further, these methods “for air observation [would] result in a
simplification of training problems for both to the Royal Artillery and
R A F .”59 Concerns remained as high up as the Air Ministry that the
modified procedure had not been adequately proved, and that there
should be further, exhaustive trials.60 These concerns were reinforced
by instructions for artillery training issued by the chief of the general
staff (c g s ): “The procedure to be used during this summer [1941] is
that laid down in A P 1176. Units of Home Forces will not carry out
experimental shooting with modified procedures.”61
Problems with the old “clock code” system in the fighting in
Libya meanwhile echoed those in France in 1940.62 Barratt retorted
that the “clock code” system was not at fault, but that the aircraft
employed in North Africa, as in France, were operating in the face
of intense enemy opposition. He too was unconvinced by the trials
in March and April 1941; they had been too few and were skewed in
favour of a positive result by the School of Artillery.63 These views
might be interpreted as simply blocking a new development that had
been shown to work in order to preserve the autonomy of the r a f .
Yet that conclusion would ignore the close cooperation of Barrett’s
command with the army in the trials.64 Barratt in fact meant what
he said about the need for more trials. With the success of these
extended trials, Barratt was then convinced that pilots were able to
conduct a shoot and that training in this new method could be done
quickly. The new procedure was to be effective from 15 June 1941.65
The work for Barratt in this area was not finished with the adoption
of the new procedure. The trials showed that the new procedure
worked most efficiently with two-way radio communications. This
system used two radios sets, the Arm y No.11 Set on the ground and,
in the Tomahawk Army Co-operation aircraft, an Arm y No.19 Set.66

59 TNA AIR 39/47, Report from Headquarters No. 70 Group to Army Co-operation
Command, 15 April 1941.
60 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Air Ministry to J.D. Woodall, 26 April 1941.
61 TNA AIR 39/47, Draft Copy of instruction an Artillery Reconnaissance training,
April 1941.
62 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from CGS on Artillery Reconnaissance, 5 May 1941.
63 TNA AIR 39/47, Letter from Barratt to Major-General Otto Lund, GHQ Home
Forces, in response from letter from CGS on Artillery Reconnaissance, 10 May 1941.
64 TNA AIR 39/47, Barratt to Lund, 10 May 1941.
65 TNA AIR 39/47, Minutes of Meetings held at the School of Artillery, Larkhill,
21 June 1941.
66 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Barratt to the Under-Secretary of State for Air
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Barratt later argued in a letter to the Under-Secretary of State for
Air that the major problem in attempting to use the two-way radios
was in the allotment of suitable frequencies on the artillery radio net.
“ [T]his promising suggestion should not be turned down because of
the frequency difficulty,” and the War Office should be pressed on
the matter.67 The director of telecommunications wrote to Barratt
assuring him that the War Office saw no difficulty in “allotting
suitable frequencies to Squadrons for Artillery Co-operation.”68
The School of Artillery still experienced problems in conducting
training exercises in the new procedure because of the unavailability
of aircraft. The problem was overcome “by the good will of the School
of Army Co-operation.”69 Arm y Co-operation Command responded to
an appeal from the School of Artillery by assigning No.225 Squadron
for these exercises.70 During a one-week practice camp using the new
procedure in early 1942 the pilots and artillery officers lived together
as they had done during the First World War which improved the
camaraderie and co-operation between the services.71

CONCLUSION

The procedure for artillery reconnaissance first developed during
the First World War where there was little movement no longer
suited the needs of modern warfare. In the earlier conflict the
relatively stable front lines allowed a system to develop, but it was
only fully effective in those particular conditions. The British forces
very quickly discovered this difficulty during their first major land
combat of the Second World War, the Battle for France in1940. The
attitudes of both the British Army and the r a f to co-operation
during the interwar period had done little to improve the situation

regarding Artillery Co-operation, 15 August 1941.
67 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Barratt to the Under-Secretary of State for Air, 3
September 1941.
68 TN A AIR 39/48, Letter from the Director of Telecommunications to Barratt, 9
October 1941.
69 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from the Senior Air Staff Officer, Army Co-operation
Command to Headquarters, No. 36 Wing, 24 October 1941.
70 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Headquarters No. 36 Wing to Senior Air Staff
Officer, Army Co-operation Command, 10 October 1941.
71 TNA AIR 39/48, Letter from Army Co-operation Command to 32, 34, 35 and 36
Wings regarding Artillery Practice Camp, 26 March 1942.
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before the b e f was despatched to France. The movement of the
a i r o p to France in February 1940 to gain experience conducting
a potentially different form of artillery reconnaissance occurred
too late and did not provide any real guidance in the wake of the
disastrous campaign.
This left those charged with the responsibility of modifying the
existing procedure with only the experience of the First World War
to guide them and on which to base their expectations. Much co
operation between the School of Artillery and Nos. 70 and 71 Groups
of Army Co-operation Command occurred, despite the general feeling
of animosity between the services.72 This co-operation was the most
that had been seen between the army and r a f since the formation of
the r a f as an independent force in 1918. Historians have interpreted
Barratt’s move to block the adoption of the new procedure during 1941
as a simple block of the a i r o p concept which prevented co-operation
with the army in this area. As this article demonstrates, however,
Barratt’s objections were more complex than a simple rejection of an
army idea. He was the senior r a f officer with the most experience
in army co-operation work and could bring additional expertise
as a former artillery officer. His caution in adopting new methods
was derived from his need for the affirmation of the results already
achieved through more rigorous testing and trials in to confirm
the results. The trials also established the suitability of specialist
observation aircraft for this role. The additional testing would expose
the procedure and those responsible for carrying it out to more stress
and thus ensure a greater degree of authenticity in the results. Trials
of this nature would also confirm whether the procedure could be
implemented with ease by the majority of pilots whose responsibility
would be increased from observing the fall of shot to conducting
shoots, potentially in the face of enemy opposition. Barratt’s major
concern with the new system appears to be its increased complexity
and he was rightly concerned after his experiences in France that
pilots would be unable to conduct the shoot while also watching for
enemy fighter attacks.

72 Hall, Strategy for Victory, 89-103.
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